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Abstract 
 
Official match-play statistics from the Champions League tournament between 2001-02 and 
2006-07 are used to estimate the impact of various variables on the performance of the teams, 
measured by goal difference. We find that offensive tactics measured by simple variables, 
such shots on goals, for both home and away teams, as well as the ranking of the teams, or 
measured by transformed variables, such as such as shots on goal and corners per ball 
possession, have a strong positive effect. Variables with negative effects are: the punishment 
of the teams, measured by own yellow and red cards per fouls committed, or simply the red 
cards, the shots wide, the corners, the ball possession difference and how smart the defendants 
are playing, measured by the number of the opposite teams’ offside per own ball possession. 
In addition, the multinomial logistic regressions show that the differences in some match 
statistics and the ranking of the teams explain 9 out of 10 home victories and almost 6 out of 
10 home defeats. Finally, one of the strongest explanatory variables, the positive difference in 
shots on goal, compared to equality in shots on goal between teams, leads to a probability of a 
home team victory by 66%.  
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Introduction 
 
Football, or soccer, is undoubtedly the king of sports. The UEFA Champions League (CL) is 
the world’s most popular tournament of football teams. More than 5 million spectators 
attended the CL matches in 2006-07 and certainly billions of people around the globe 
followed the matches live through TV. The participating teams earned millions of €, revenues 
which are mainly derived from TV rights, marketing and public. In 2005-06 CL tournament, 
the estimated budgeted income was €591m. (see 
http://www.uefa.com/Competitions/UCL/index.html).  
 
The UEFA CL comprises of three qualifying rounds, a group stage, and four knockout rounds. 
The 16 winners of the third qualifying round ties, played late summer, join a similar number 
of automatic entrants in the 32-team group stage. At the group stage, the clubs are split into 
eight groups of four teams, who play home and away against each of their pool opponents, 
between September and December, to decide which two teams from each pool will advance to 
the first knockout round that starts in February. The third-place finishers in each pool enter 
the UEFA Cup round of 32 and the clubs that finish in fourth position are eliminated.  From 
the last 16 until the semi-finals, teams play two matches against each other, at home and 
away, with the same rules as the qualifying rounds applied. In the last 16, the group winners 
play the runners-up other than teams from their own pool or nation, while from the quarter-
finals on, the draw is without restrictions. The final is always decided by a single match.  All 
together, the CL tournament consists of 125 matches, 96 in the group stage (12 matches in 
every group) and 29 matches (16 + 8 + 4 + 1) in the elimination stage1. 
 
Empirical research on sporting production functions has exploded over the last decade (see for 
instance a recent article by Borland, 2005). Since the pioneer work by Scully (1974), who 
tested empirically the relationship between the salaries and the marginal revenue product of 
players in Major League Baseball, many empirical studies have treated the team as a firm that 
produces its output (scores more goals than it concedes, wins matches and collects points) by 
combining its factors of production (selecting the best players, the best managers, the best 
training centres, paying higher salaries etc).  
                                                 
1 During 2001-02 and 2002-03 tournaments, there were two group stages and two knockout rounds 
with 157 matches, i.e. 96, in the first group, 48 (= 12*4) in the second group, and 8 + 4 +1 in the 
elimination stage. 
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 In Europe, most of empirical studies concentrate on football. For instance, Carmichael et al. 
(2000), (2001) used tournament aggregated match play for each team, over a full league 
season, to examine team performance by English Premiership teams. Carmichael and Thomas 
(2005) used match statistics from the Euro 2004, Dawson et al. (2000a, 2000b) estimated 
frontier production functions for English association football, Kern and Sussmuth (2003) 
estimated functions for the German Bundesliga and Espita-Escuer and Garcia-Cebrian (2004) 
for la Liga (Spanish first division football teams). Other recent studies are by Lucey and 
Power (2004) for Italy, by Garicano et al. (2005) for Italy and Spain, by Seckin (2006), for 
Turkey and by Buraimo et al. (2007) for Germany and England. 
 
Usually, the pre-game and/or match-play variables differ among the empirical studies. Falter 
and Pérignon (2000) found that the results in football matches affected more by socio-
economic factors than main football variables, using statistics from the French Première 
Division. Krautmann (1990) measured a player’s performance with the time left to next 
contract negotiation, Dawson et al., (2000b), in their study of English football, measured the 
ability of players with age, career league experiences and goals scored in the previous season. 
Carmichael and Thomas (1995) differentiated between ability and performance and used a 
two stage approach, where a player’s ability influences his performance and the players’ 
performance influences the team performance. In other studies, Kahn (1993) found that 
managerial quality and experience is positively related to both team and player performance, 
while Dawson et al., (2000a) found a weaker correlation. Using game theory, Hirotshu and 
Wright (2006), found that the probability of winning a match in the Japanese League, is 
affected by managers’ decisions to change the team’s formation during the game. Fort and 
Quirk (1995) and Szymanski (2003) found that the team winning percentage is related to the 
“units of talent” owned by a team relative to its competitors. Pollard (2002) found that the 
attendance and home pitch size are also important, while Buraimo et al. (2007) found that the 
existence of a track that separates the pitch from the spectators makes referees decisions 
unbiased (!). They also found that derby matches differ, while Scarf and Bilbao (2006), did 
not find any differences in derby matches. Finally, other researches, Lucey and Power (2004) 
for Italy, Garicano et al.(2005) for Italy and Spain, Buraimo et al. (2007) for Germany and 
England found a home team favouritism by referees.  
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In this paper we attempt to explain victories or defeats by concentrating on the match-play 
variables only. The only pre-game variable which we used in our regressions is the UEFA 
ranking of the teams.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In next section we discuss shortly the data we used and the 
expected effects of the variables. In section three and four we present our OLS and 
multinomial logistic estimates. Section five concludes the paper. 
2. Data and Variables  
 
Between September 2001 and May 2007, 814 matches have been played in the group stages 
and the knockout rounds. Two matches, Roma-Dynamo Kyiv and Inter-Milan, were forfeited 
and one match, Galatasaray-Juventus, was played in a neutral ground in Germany. In three 
matches the result was decided on extra time and in four matches, inclusive the 2003 and 
2005 finals, the result was decided after the penalty shoot-outs. The collected statistics consist 
of 806 observations (matches), i.e. excluding the two forfeited matches and the six finals.  
 
There is no subjectivity in the selection of variables, since we used all match statistics, found 
in UEFA’s official site (http://www.uefa.com/competitions/ucl/history/index.html). Many 
interesting match-play statistics, like passes to own team player in scoring or outside scoring 
zones, passes to opposite team player in scoring or outside scoring zones, goalkeeper saves, 
penalties, foul kicks from different zones, shots that hit woodwork, counter-attacks, long ball 
crosses, ball possession in a field’s various zones, are missing.  
 
The only pre-game variable to measure a team’s quality is the UEFA ranking coefficient 
found in (http://www.xs4all.nl/~kassiesa/bert/uefa/data/index.html). According to the rules of 
the CL tournament, the groups were decided on a draw based on four different pools of UEFA 
ranking, so that teams of the same pool were paired with teams of other pools. Although it is 
based on a team’s and a country’s recent football historical performance, a team with a high 
ranking is expected to defeat a team with a lower ranking, other things being equal.  
 
The team ranking is measured in aggregate points, and over this six year period, some teams 
have advanced while other teams deteriorated their position. To simplify the comparison of 
teams over the whole period, the ranking in terms of points has been transformed to a dummy 
variable (Rank), which captures the quality of teams in their matches. In every match, the 
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team with a higher UEFA ranking takes the value “1” and the other team takes the value “0”. 
Obviously, we expect better teams to win the majority of their games.  
 
Table A1 (in Appendix) depicts some descriptive statistics of all published variables, from all 
806 matches. In Table A2 we show the correlation matrix of all selected variables. The up-
left and down-right sub-matrices show the own coefficients for the home and away teams 
respectively. The up-right sub-matrix shows cross correlations, i.e. it correlates home (away) 
teams’ variables with away (home) teams’ ones. 
The interested reader can observe that Monaco holds the goals scored record, both at home, 
with eight goals, and away, with five goals, against the same team (!), Deportivo. Another 
French team, Lyon, has the record in home corners (20), Valencia has the record in home 
shots on goal (19), and Barcelona together with Valencia are the two teams that hold the ball 
most of the time (71%), in their matches against Celtic and Inter respectively. The Italian 
team Juventus is the team with the lowest playing time, since it hold the ball for only 13 
minutes (!), in their away match against Werder Bremen. In addition, Juventus players are in 
top position regarding the number of offside both at home and away and the number of fouls 
committed at home, while Olympiacos is leading the fouls committed in away matches. 
Arsenal and PSV have the best record of fouls committed at home (with just 4 fouls). 
Lokomotiv is the only team that did not manage to shoot even a single shot on goal (in its 
match against Milan), while Panathinaikos is the only team whose players did not have a 
single shot wide in a home match (against Schalke).  Finally, Roma is leading the number of 
yellow cards at home with 8 cards (!) in their match against Lyon. 
The output measure of tournaments varies. Some researchers, Carmichael and Thomas 
(2005), and Seckin (2006), use goals scored (GS), or goals difference (GD). Fort and Quirk 
(1995), Szymanski (2003), Espita-Escuer and Garcia-Cebrian (2004), use winning percentage, 
while Dawson et al. (2000a), use points won from the tournament.  
 
Our dependant variable is GD = (Home Team’s GS – Away Team’s GS). The extra-time 
result counts in our goals, but not the result from penalty shoots-out. Obviously, GD2 is a 
                                                 
2 Notice that, if team A and team B end up with the same points, in second place, at the group stage, 
and their matches finished (A-B): 2-1 and (B-A): 1-0, team B, with the away goal scored, qualifies, 
despite the fact that GD = 0 in both matches, and even if team A had a better GD from its remaining 
four group matches compared to team B.  
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discrete variable, with positive (negative) values implying a home victory (defeat) and zero 
values, implying a draw. Paired samples test show that the match GD is +0.537 goals, which 
is strongly significant (at the 0.01 level) from zero. In addition to that, home teams have won 
403 of their home matches and lost “only” 192 games.  
 
Scarf and Bilbao (2006) and Caruso (2007) show that the design of the UEFA CL influences 
the outcome uncertainty of the tournament and the number of unimportant matches. For 
instance, the winner of 2007 UEFA CL, Milan, was already qualified as winner from their 
group when they played their last match at home, against Lille. Moreover, that match was 
very important to Lille (and to AEK Athens as well who played in Belgium against 
Anderlecht), who both competed for the second qualifying place. If Milan loose that match it 
would loose “only” the victory premium of CHF 500,000 (but had already earned CHF 4.25 
million from its other matches and its qualification). If Lille won, it would earn CHF 3 
million, i.e. CHF 500,000 from that victory and CHF 2.5 million from its qualification. 
Caruso (2007) argues that such asymmetry in earnings/defeats could lead to “unilateral 
match-fixing”3.  
It is difficult to draw the border line between the unimportant to the qualifying teams’ 
matches and the important ones. A quick investigation of the data reveals that there are at 
least 40 unimportant matches (to the qualifying teams) and around 50-70 “theoretically” 
important ones, where one or more teams from the same group had a very low probability of 
qualification in the last match-day(s). Obviously, all these matches were played at the group 
stages. But it is unclear if the already qualified teams pay attention to the unimportant 
matches or not, or are involved in “unilateral match-fixing”. Despite the fact that this 
hypothesis has not been tested statistically, a detailed investigation of the group standings in 
40 last day unimportant matches, (of which 28 played at the already qualified teams’ home 
ground), reveals that the qualified teams lost “only” in 15 of matches. It still remains an open 
and interesting hypothesis and worthy to test in another paper. 
                                                 
3 Lille won away that “unimportant” match to Milan by 2-0 and qualified at the cost of AEK. The Greek 
supporters who felt that the match was “fixed” supported in massive the other finalist, Liverpool, in the Athens 
final against Milan. Moreover, taking into consideration the way Milan was qualified last summer for this years’ 
CL, after the Italian “Calciopoli scandal”,  it is extremely unlikely that the Italian team would be involved in 
such a “match-fixing”. Milan did not approach that match seriously because it concentrated more on its “Serie 
A” matches, to gain points that have been deduced as a consequence of the “Calciopoli scandal”.   
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Since such unexpected home defeats will disturb the significance of our estimates, all these 
(40-110) “unimportant” matches should be excluded. But, instead of excluding these matches 
at the group stages, we run regressions with all (806) matches, the 671 group matches and the 
135 “knockout” matches to investigate if our estimates differ.  
The explanatory variables are classified in two groups: (i) observed variables and their 
differences; (ii) transformed variables to reflect offensive, defensive and other strategies of 
home and away teams. 
 
(i) Observed variables and their differences (for both home (H) and away (A) teams) 
Shots on Goal4 (SoG): Obviously, since goals are mainly the result of SoG, teams and 
players who are shooting frequently on goal, are expected to score more goals, i.e. it is 
expected that: .0
ASoG
AGS,0
HSoG
HGS ;; ∂
∂
∂
∂  Indeed, from Table A2 we observe that SoG are 
strongly significant correlated to GS (at the 0.01 level). The probability that a SoG scores, 
varies significantly with both the location of the shot and with other factors. Pollard and Reep 
(1997) estimated that the scoring probability is 24% higher for every yard nearer goal and the 
scoring probability doubles when a player manages to be over 1 yard from an opponent when 
shooting the ball. From Table A1 we observe that, on average, teams need about 4 SoG to 
score a goal. The most extreme cases are observed in the match Deportivo la Coruna-
Manchester United (0-2) where Deportivo had 15 SoG(!) without a single goal and also in the 
match Milan-PSV (0-0) with 12 SoG from the Milan players. It is difficult to argue if such 
inefficiencies depend on the low quality of shots, the excellent quality of the opponents’ 
defendants and goalkeepers, or just bad luck.  
Regarding the SoG differences (SoGD) = (HSoG – ASoG), as expected, the home teams who 
play more offensive, will have more SoG. Paired samples test show that the match difference 
is almost +1.9, which is strongly significant from zero. Since GD is positive, we expect that 
.0
SoGD
GS,0
ASoG
GS,0
HSoG
GS ;≺; ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂   
Corners (C): Despite the fact that GS directly from corner (C) kicks are very rare, the more 
corners a team wins, the higher is the chance of converting then into goals, i.e. we expect 
                                                 
4 “Shots on goal” is the official name, but it includes also the heads on goal. 
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exactly similar effects as with SoG, but perhaps not equally strong. A large number of C won 
is in fact an indicator of playing an offensive game that puts high pressure on the opponent 
team, frustrating them, hopefully forcing them to make mistakes in defence and finally score. 
Moreover, from Table A2 we observe that the correlation coefficients between HGS (AGS) 
and HC (AC) are not significant from zero. On the other hand, C are strongly related to SoG 
and to ball possession for both home and away teams. Home teams gain statistically more C 
than away teams, since the match corner difference CD = (HC – AC) is +1.7 corners, which is 
strongly significant from zero. Therefore, as above, we expect that 
.0
CD
GS,0
AC
GS,0
HC
GS ;≺; ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂  
 
Ball Possession (BP): Ball possession (BP) is often measured in share of playing time or in 
minutes of effective playing time5. It is expected that teams who manage to keep the ball most 
of the time, they must have control over the game, are expected to shooting more SoG, score 
more goals and win the game, i.e. similar effects as with SoG and C. But again, as with C 
above, from Table A2 we observe that the correlation coefficients between HBP (ABP) share 
and HGS (AGS), are not significant from zero. Also the correlation coefficient between BP in 
minutes and GS is not significant from zero. Normally, home teams, often cheered by home 
crowd, are expected to have higher control of the ball most of the time. Indeed, the match 
difference BPD = (HBP – ABP) is almost +4% (or about +2.15 minutes), which is strongly 
significant from zero. We expect that .0
BPD
GS,0
ABP
GS,0
HBP
GS ;≺; ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂  
 
Fouls committed (FC): Football matches without fouls committed (FC) do not exist. 
Obviously, the main purpose with fouls is to prohibit the opponent players from playing their 
game, from gaining ground and shooting from favourable positions in order to score goals. 
For instance, in Table 2A we observe that teams commit less fouls if they keep the ball more 
time, win more corners and have more SoG. In fact, five out of six correlations coefficients 
for both home and away teams are significant negative. It is also clear, but only for the home 
teams, that they commit more fouls when the away teams tend to keep the ball more time. On 
the other hand, away teams commit statistically more fouls than home teams. For instance, the 
                                                 
5 As Table A1 indicates, the effective playing time in minutes might not be measured consistently in all matches. 
For instance, it seems very unlikely that Barcelona kept the ball for 44 (!) minutes, in its away victory against 
Udinese at the group stage in 2005-06 (0-2), even if Barcelona had an excellent performance that night in Italy. 
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match difference FCD = (HFC – AFC) is almost -1.4 fouls, which is strongly significant from 
zero. The own and cross effects of FC are unclear and depend mainly on: (i) how successfully 
the fouls are in disturbing the opponent team with its constructive play; (ii) to what extent 
fouls won are converted into goals, especially if FC are near the goal area; (iii) if FC are 
“unsporting” enough or not to be punished by yellow or red cards. Seckin (2006), using 
statistics from the Turkish League, found that own FC, by both home and away teams, affect 
their respective GS negatively, while the cross effects of FC on GS are positive.  
 
Yellow cards (YC): Unsporting behaviour, such as hazardous FC, lead to yellow cards (YC). 
In Table A2 we observe that, FC are strongly related with YC, to both home and away teams. 
Players are booked with YC for other reasons as well, such as throwing the ball off the ground 
deliberately in order to gain time, or if the player uses an offensive language and gestures, or 
if he takes his shirts off to express his joy after a goal etc. FC to both teams, precisely as YC, 
are strongly correlated, indicating that the referees try to balance the game. Buraimo et al 
(2007) found also that an extra YC received by the away (home) team previously in the 
match, is associated with increased probability of home (away) team YC, within three 
minutes. Calm matches, with a few fouls from both teams, are not punished with cards. Harsh 
matches on the other hand lead to many fouls and as a consequence, to more cards to both 
teams. It is expected that YC have a negative effect on the players’ performance, because they 
must continue play by the rules, and be less aggressive in defence. Thus, the affected team is 
influenced negatively, while the other team should be favoured, i.e., we expect the following 
effects: .0
AYC
AGS,0
HYC
HGS ≺≺ ∂
∂
∂
∂   
 
As mentioned earlier, some studies show that home teams are favoured by referees in terms of 
less YC to home team’s players. In Table A1 we observe that home teams received 1159 YC 
while away teams received 1658 cards. The match difference YCD = (HYC – AYC) is -0.62 
cards and is strongly significant from zero. Thus, we expect that .0
YCD
GS ≺∂
∂  
 
Red cards (RC): The heaviest punishment during a match is expulsion of a player through a 
red card (RC). The unsporting behaviour that leads to RC depends on many factors. For 
instance, according to Table A2, teams who commit many fouls tend to get more RC (which 
is strongly significant for the home teams), Also teams who collect many YC they collect RC 
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too. If the opposite team has control over the game, the own teams’ players are desperate and 
get more RC. On the other hand, if their own team has control over the game, they play by 
the rules and they do not receive many RC. Common sense implies a negative impact for the 
affected team, i.e. we expect similar signs as for YC, .0
ARC
AGS,0
HRC
HGS ≺≺ ∂
∂
∂
∂  From Table A2 
we observe that YC are strongly related to RC for both teams. In addition, the home teams’ 
FC are punished by RC, but not the away teams’.  
 
Caliendo and Radic (2006) examined to what effect the old football myth that an expulsion of 
a player might be beneficial, because it increases the team spirit as well as the efforts of the 
affected team, is true. They found out that the myth can not be supported for the first hour of 
the game. Early expulsions during the first half of the match increase the winning probability 
of the non-affected team considerably. A late red card, shown during the last 30 minutes of 
the game, does not change the final result of the match. Since we have no detailed 
information on the current score of the game the time the player was sent off, we cannot test 
to what extent that myth is true in CL matches. From Table A2 we observe though that only 
the home team is affected significantly negative by expulsion of its players, despite the fact 
that Table A1 shows that away teams received 70% more RC than home teams (88 versus 
52). The match difference RCD = (HRC-ARC) is -0.045 a difference which is strongly 
significant from zero6. Thus, precisely as with YC, but even more strongly, we expect that 
.0
RCD
GS ≺∂
∂  
 
Offside (O): Players are caught for offside (O) for different reasons. Often, the away teams’ 
players are O when: (i) the defenders of the home team play high up on the ground, either 
deliberately, or because their home team plays an offensive game; (ii) the offensive players of 
the affected team usually wait for passes or crosses from their fellow-players, far away and 
isolated without noticing that they are out of play, especially when their own team defends in 
its away matches. It is relative easy for the home teams’ defenders to keep an eye on the O 
position opponent forward. Contrary to the “simple” O strategy of the away teams, the home 
teams’ players whose team plays more offensive, might be caught for O when they participate 
in the attacking play and pay less attention about their position, when they get the ball, usually 
                                                 
6 In a recent study by Buraimo et al (2007), the existence of a running track in stadium, has a positive, 
and marginally significant impact on home team’s probability of red cards! 
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from short passes. The probability of mistakes from the away teams’ defenders is therefore 
higher, if they are under continuous attack.  
 
The frequency of O in a match is not high. On average, players are caught for O almost once 
per quarter. Despite the fact that the number of O per team, is almost the same (around 3.3), 
these variables are not correlated. The effect of O is unclear and will depend on the success of 
the O strategies. For instance, if ,0
AO
AGS ;∂
∂  it implies that away teams are successful in their 
simple O strategy. If at the same time ,0
AO
HGS ≺∂
∂ the home teams must play very cautiously 
against the away team’s offensive player(s), who are often “forgotten offside”, and as a 
consequence they do not attack extensively and might not score many goals. Similarly, the 
offside difference (OD) = (HO-AO) would imply a negative effect on GS, i.e. .0
OD
GS ≺∂
∂  
 
Shot wide (SW): If SoG are expected to be positive to GS, shots wide (SW) are negative, or 
at least irrelevant to GS, i.e. .0
ASoG
AGS,0
HSW
HGS ≤∂
∂≤∂
∂  Very often, players are shooting wide if 
they are under pressure from the opponent players, and take a chance, often from a long 
distance. From Table A2 we can see that SW for both teams are correlated with all other 
respective variables in a similar manner. They are positive to SoG, BP and C and negative to 
FC, YC and O. Home teams are shooting wider than away teams, a difference which is 
strongly significant from zero. This is perhaps due to the fact that home teams have more 
SoG, higher BP and more corners than away teams, i.e., in variables which are strongly 
related with SW. Another reason is that home teams who score more goals than away teams 
might be less careful with their final shots. The match difference (SWD) = (HSW-ASW) is 
+1.725 shots wide, which is strongly significant from zero. It is therefore expected that 
.0
SWD
GS,0
ASW
GS,0
HSW
GS ≺;≺ ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂  
 
(ii) Transformed variables 
 
Following Carmichael and Thomas (2005), we defined ten new variables (five per team) to 
capture some offensive and defensive tactics in their home and away matches. 
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HBP
HCHSoG1O +=  (1), 
ABP
ACASoG1X +=    (1) ´ 
HSWHSoG
HSoG2O +=  (2), ASWASoG
ASoG2X +=   (2) ´ 
 
O1 and X1 reflect the strength of offensive play of home and away teams in terms of SoG and 
C won, relative to their BP. O2 and X2 reflect the quality of their offensive play respectively. 
Moreover, neither of these pairs is correlated. From Table A1 we observe that home teams 
seem to have higher values in both numerator and denominator, for both variables, but 
slightly higher ratios. Almost 48.5% of the home teams’ shots are SoG, compared to almost 
47% of the away teams. It seems that home teams, instead of taking a chance and shooting 
wide, they keep the ball within the team more time and try to shooting on goal when a better 
opportunity arises. Away teams on the other hand, play more defensive, keep the ball less 
time and take higher chances, by shooting, from less favourable positions, more often wide. 
Since the GD is positive, it is expected that O1 and O2 will be positive while X1 and X2 will 
be negative.  
 
ABP
HFC1D =    (3),  
HBP
AFC1Y =   (3) ´ 
 
D1 and Y1 are measures of defensive strategies of home and away teams. Notice that D1 
relates home FC to away team’s BP and D2 relates away FC to the home team’s BP. The 
more time team A keeps the ball the more fouls team B has to commit, either in order to gain 
the ball, or to prohibit the opponent team’s players from shooting at goal and scoring goals. 
Alternatively, teams who keep the ball for a long time they do not need to commit many fouls. 
The signs of these variables depend of course on both FC and BP. Despite the fact that these 
variables are strongly (positive) correlated, their difference (D1-Y1) is negative (statistically 
different from zero), indicating higher values in Y1. Since the GD is positive, if Y1 is 
negative (positive), it implies (i) that the away teams’ FC tactics is unsuccessful (successful), 
and (ii) that D1 can not have the same sign as Y1.  
 
HFC
HRCHYC2D +=  (4),  
AFC
ARCAYC2Y +=  (4) ´ 
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D2 and Y2 are disciplinary measures taken by the referees, indicating the degree of despair or 
ineffectiveness of the observed team’s defensive play aimed at dispossessing the opponents. 
While Carmichael and Thomas (2005) used only YC awarded against the observed team FC, 
we use both YC and RC. High ratios indicate a much tougher play and harsh FC. D2 and Y2 
are also strongly (positive) correlated while their negative difference (D2-Y2) is statistically 
(weakly) different from zero. In accordance with our argument on YC and RC previously, it is 
expected that the effect of D2 should be negative and of Y2 positive. 
 
HBP
AO3D =   (5),  
ABP
HO3Y =   (5) ´ 
 
Finally, D3 and Y3 reflect how smart the home and away defenders play. These variables are 
not correlated and their sign is unclear. If the effect of D3 is positive, it implies that the away 
team’s O strategy is not successful, because the higher their O for given home BP, the more 
goals the home team scores. To put it differently, it would be better for them if their players 
played more defensively and helped their team instead of being caught often for O. If the 
effect of D3 is negative their O strategy is more successful because the home team defence 
must always keep an eye on the away team’s forward players, and the home team plays rather 
cautiously in its offensive play, leading to fewer goals scored7. Similar arguments apply if the 
effect of Y3 is positive or negative. Although it is theoretically possible that both teams to be 
successful or unsuccessful in their O strategies and hence both variables to have the same 
sign, it is very unlikely.  
 
 
3. OLS estimates 
 
 
Estimating teams’ production functions from match statistics is a very difficult task, not only 
to researchers on football, but to the best football managers as well! This is due to the 
following reasons: First of all, the simplistic linear or log-linear functions which are often 
used might be incorrect if some of the variables interact with each other in an unknown non-
linear relationship. Second, tactical moves and teams’ systems also interact in an unknown 
manner during a football match. Third, all variables and statistics are, to some extent 
                                                 
7 It can also imply that some of away team’s goals might have been disallowed as “limit” cases! 
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questionable irrespectively of how many one uses, or how well are transformed to catch 
various tactics or strategies. 
 
This paper does not claim that the model specification is correct, even if some attention was 
paid to cure some of the problems mentioned above, like the non-linearity forms. 
 
The following very simple linear model was specified:  
 
jj2211 Xb...XbXbaY +++=  
 
Y is the dependant variable (GD), X is a vector of explanatory variables mentioned above. As 
mentioned earlier, the mean value of GD is almost 0.53 which is statistically significant from 
zero at the 0.01 level. 
 
We run a very large number of OLS estimates. Some of the variables (like FC and YC) were 
used both as independent and in a multiplicative form as well (FC*YC), conditioned first on 
“at least 4 FC” and then on “at least 7 FC”. We used first BP in % and repeated the 
regressions with BP in minutes. When we used BP in minutes, we squared that variable to see 
whether there are increasing or decreasing returns to BP.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the stepwise estimates with non-transformed and transformed 
explanatory variables, where all non-significant variables, inclusive the non-linearity as 
above, are omitted. Despite the fact that the explanatory power of all three specifications is 
rather low, many estimates seem to be rather robust, irrespectively if we used all 806 matches 
(first column), or the sub-groups of 671 group matches (second column), or the 135 play-off 
matches (third column). Most estimates have the expected sign while others are not. 
 
In model (a) the signs of HSoG, ASoG, HRC, HSW, ASW and Rank are as expected. Given 
for instance the mean values of HSoG (6.27) and of ASoG (4.37), the estimates show that the 
home team wins by almost 1.4 goals if the home team is shooting 6 times on goal, and it 
looses by almost a goal if the away team is shooting 4 times on goal. This is close to the GD 
which is 0.53 goals. Away teams seem also to be successful with their O strategy (but not 
home teams), since the GD decreases when their players are often offside! Notice that both 
SoG are extremely significant (actually at the 0.001 level). 
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Table 1:  OLS stepwise significant estimates  
Estimates (first column) and t-values (second column) 
135 play-off matches All 806 matches 671 group matches
Including Rank Excluding Rank 
Explanatory 
variable 
 (a) observed explanatory variables 
Constant -.867 -1.640 -1.193* -2.043 -.707 -1.674 -.498 -1.171 
HSoG .225** 13.089 .203** 10.789 .226** 5.556 .245** 5.976 
ASoG -.238** -10.936 -.270** -11.068 -.152** -3.182 -.157** -3.220 
HC -.074** -4.222 -  -  -  
AC .073** 3.401 .098** 4.156 -  -  
AO -.050** -2.583 -.067** -3.118 -  -  
HRC -.495** -2.727 -.592** -2.984 -  -  
ARC .305* 2.162 -  -  -  
ABP (%) .022* 2.312 .029** 2.772 -  -  
HSW -.056** -3.159 -.073** -3.662 -.088* -2.453 -.099** -2.709 
ASW .065** 3.322 .044* 2.056 .170** 3.636 .180** 3.791 
Rank .656** 6.353 .614** 5.193 .569** 2.679   
_
2R  0.357  0.355  0.303  0.270  
 (b) differences between home and away teams variables 
Constant .029 .411 .051 .660 .083 .506 .373** 2.890 
SoGD  .231** 16.68 .233** 15.64 .202** 5.860 .216** 6.202 
CD -.073** -5.743 -.086** -6.292 -  -  
RCD -.384** -3.352 -.369** -2.899 -  -  
FCD .015* 2.085 .021** 2.732 -  -  
BPD (%-units) -.009* -1.995 - - -  -  
SWD -.064** -5.044 -.065** -4.834 -.118** -4.658 -.129** -5.016
Rank .684** 6.651 .606** 5.365 .589** 2.797   
_
2R  0.358  0.366  0.288  0.252  
 (c) transformed explanatory variables  
Constant -0.338  1.07 0.621  1.71 -1.339** 2.39 -1.25*  2.19 
O1 1.244** 2.73 -  2.155* 2.35 2.214* 2.35 
O2 3.517** 10.27 3.61** 9.52 3.39** 4.19 3.872** 4.77 
X1 -1.113* 2.19 -1.60** 2.85 -  -  
X2 -2.138** 8.08 -2.27** 7.51 -1.78** 3.44 -1.83** 3.45 
D2 -1.588* 2.40 -1.56* 2.08 -  -  
D3 -  -2.58* 2.23 -  -  
Y1 -  -1.06* 2.05 -  -  
Y3 -2.408* 2.31 -  -  -  
Rank 0.688** 6.57 0.699** 5.99 0.625** 2.85   
_
2R  0.268  0.271  0.236  0.194  
Note: ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, * denotes significance at the 0.05 level; absolute t-statistics in 
parentheses 
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On the other hand, contrary to what was expected, HC and AC have the opposite signs! Also, 
even if it makes no difference whether the home team holds the ball, it is better if the away 
team holds the ball instead. The more they keep the ball the higher the GD to the home team! 
 
Are these unexpected estimates wrong? If we start with the second one, home teams can score 
more goals than concede, even if their higher ball possession can not explain that. On the 
other hand, when away teams keep the ball they seem to be less efficient, either because they 
keep it at a zone which is safe enough for the home team (which is not tested due to data 
shortcomings), or/and because they are shooting statistically less on home teams’ goal. 
 
Regarding the opposite effects of HC and AC, there are two plausible explanations: First of 
all, HC and AC are strongly correlated with HSW and ASW respectively, implying that heads 
and shots after a corner kick are simply inefficient. Second, many teams let their tall 
defendants to enter the opponent team’s penalty area when a corner is kicked, hoping that 
they score. That strategy is very risky though, because if it fails, their defence is very open 
and counter attacks can lead to goals from the opponent team! Again, data shortcomings do 
not permit us to test this interesting hypothesis.   
 
In model (b), when all variables are measured as differences between home and away teams, 
the estimates are consistent with those in model (a), such as the Rank, SoGD, SWD, BPD, 
RCD and CD. Moreover, there are two differences in this model: (i) FCD is weakly positive 
now, indicating that it pays to home teams to commit fouls, as long as these fouls are not 
followed by YC or RC. Fouls are of course punished by free kicks that might be intersected 
and the ball might be gained from the own team, or might be shooting wide, and appeared as 
an observation in SW. (ii) OD is not significant now. Notice also that, not only the sign of the 
variables is unaffected but even its value remains rather similar, irrespectively if we run the 
regressions with all matches, or the 671 group matches only. 
 
In model (c) almost all coefficients are as expected, and are in full accordance with the 
previous two models. Precisely as Carmichael and Thomas (2005), we also found significant 
positive effects of O1 and negative effects of D2. When HC (AC) and HSoG (ASoG) were 
added into O1 (X1), the overall effect is strongly positive (weakly negatively), which is 
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equivalent to the positive (negative) HSoG (ASoG) found in models (a) and (b). The negative 
(positive) effects of HC (AC) found in models (a) and (b) were not strong enough to turn the 
aggregate effect of SoG and corners into negative, simply because SoG is the strongest 
explanatory variable. Moreover, while in model (a) the away team’s O strategy seemed to be 
successful when we used all 806 and the 671 group matches, it now remained successful (but 
weaker) only in the 671 group matches. When we used 806 matches, Y3 is negative (at the 
0.05 level of significance though), implying that it is not the away teams that are successful 
with their O strategy, it is instead the home teams that fail with their own O strategy. 
  
4. Multinomial logistic estimates 
 
 
Multinomial logistic regression is the extension of the binary logistic regression when the 
categorical dependent variable has more than two possibilities (see for instance, Hosmer and 
Lemeshow, (2000), or Chan, (2005). In a football match, the dependant variable, “result” has 
three categories, victory, draw and defeat. For each one of these categories, there exist a 
number of continuous variables Z that are expected to belong to these three categories with 
some probability. Obviously, to identify all these variables and predict all three possible results 
with high accuracy is extremely difficult, if possible!  
 
Mathematically, the relationship between the Z’s and the probability of a particular result is 
described in the formula below: 
iK2i1i
ik
ZZZ
Z
ik eee
e
++=π ,    (6) 
where πik is the probability the ith case falls in category k = 1,2,3 and Zik is the value of the kth 
unobserved continuous variable for the ith case. 
Zik is assumed to be linearly related to the predictors J, such as: 
iJkJ2i2k1i1kkoik xb...xbxbbZ ++++= ,   (7) 
where xij is the predictor for the ith case and bkj is the coefficient for the kth unobserved 
variable. 
Since Zk is unobserved, we must relate the predictors from (7) to (6) which are transformed to: 
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Since our OLS estimates show that SoG is the strongest explanatory variable, we use that as a 
categorical predictor, defined as: 
0SoGDifif,3SGDif
;0SoGDifif,2SGDif
;0SoGDifif,1)ASoGHSoG(SGDif
<=
==
>=−=
 
 
In addition, as our quantitative variables, we use all other differences (those who were used in 
model (b) previously, irrespectively if they were significant or not) and Rank. 
 
The trinomial result is defined as:  
0DifferenceGoalif,3defeatehom
;0DifferenceGoalif,2draw
;0DifferenceGoalif,1victoryehom
<=
==
>=
 
 
The coefficients are estimated through an iterative maximum likelihood method, developed by 
the SPSS package, excluding the constant. SPSS allows us to choose the reference category in 
order to compare the other categories. Our chosen reference category is “draw”, which will be 
compared to “victory” and to “defeat”. The estimates are depicted in Table 2. 
 
The likelihood ratio tests show that Rank, SGDif, RCD, CD and SWD are statistically 
significant in explaining the result of a CL match.  
 
The probability of home victory (upper half) and home defeat (lower half) is in the last 
column. Notice that these probabilities are relative to the reference category draw. It is clear 
that the victory and defeat probabilities are consistent to each other. For instance, in home 
matches when home teams have positive SGDif, compared to matches with equality in SoG, 
the probability of a home victory is 66.22%. When in the home matches the SGDif is 
negative, the probability of a home victory is reduced to 33.86%. Similarly, the probability to 
loose a home match with a positive SGDif is only 30.39% and is much higher, 65.57%, if the 
home team has less SoG than the away team.  
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Table 2:  Multinomial logistic estimates: (N = 806)  
Explanatory 
Variable B 
Std. 
error Sig. 
Be = 
OR 
Prob= 
odds /(1+odds) 
Home victory 
Rank .976 .194 .000 2.654 .7263 
YCD .013 .058 .826 1.013 .5032 
RCD -.587 .234 .012 .556 .3573 
BPD  -.013 .009 .150 .987 .4967 
OD .015 .025 .540 1.015 .5037 
FCD .005 .014 .744 1.005 .5012 
CD -.030 .024 .223 .971 .4926 
SWD -.077 .024 .001 .925 .4805 
[SGDif=1,00] .673 .161 .000 1.960 .6622 
[SGDif=2,00] -.074 .296 .802 .928 .4813 
[SGDif=3,00] -.670 .217 .002 .512 .3386 
Home defeat 
Rank -.545 .237 .021 .580 .3671 
YCD .044 .066 .502 1.045 .5110 
RCD .283 .260 .277 1.327 .5703 
BPD  .007 .011 .486 1.007 .5017 
OD -.033 .029 .262 .968 .4919 
FCD -.010 .016 .538 .990 .4975 
CD .091 .028 .001 1.095 .5227 
SWD .004 .028 .875 1.004 .5010 
[SGDif=1,00] -.833 .212 .000 .435 .3031 
[SGDif=2,00] .067 .306 .826 1.070 .5169 
[SGDif=3,00] .645 .182 .000 1.905 .6557 
Chi-Square 350.49  .000   
Pseudo 
_
2R  Cox & Snell = .353, Nagelkerke = .397, McFadden
8 = .198 
  
Note: Dependant variable is match result in two categories (home victory = 1, or home defeat = 3). The reference 
category is draw = 2. Estimates are without constant, which was not statistically different from zero. The values 
under B are the log Odds-Ratios (OR) of home victory versus draw and home defeat versus draw. Sig. stands for 
significance level. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Cox and Snell's R2 is based on the log likelihood for the model compared to the log likelihood for a baseline 
model. However, with categorical outcomes, it has a theoretical maximum value of less than 1, even for a 
"perfect" model. Nagelkerke's R2 is an adjusted version of the Cox & Snell R-square that adjusts the scale of the 
statistic to cover the full range from 0 to 1. Finally, McFadden's R2 is another version, based on the log-
likelihood kernels for the intercept-only model and the full estimated model. 
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The home victory probability for teams with higher Rank is (72.63%), and the home defeat 
probability is (36.71%). With a positive RCD, as expected, the home victory probability is 
rather low, 35.73%, while the home defeat probability is 57.03%. Finally, the home victory 
probability is almost 48% with a positive SWD and the home defeat probability is 52.27% 
with a positive CD. 
 
In Table 3 we show the predicted power of all three results. Cells on the diagonal are correct 
predictions and off the diagonal are the incorrect ones. As a whole, this model predicts the 
correct results in 6 matches out of 10. The home victory probability is predicted in 9 out of 10 
matches, the home defeat in slightly less than 6 matches out of 10, while the reference 
category, draw is predicted very poorly, in less than 1 match out of 10. Compared to the 
respective observed results or marginal percentage (i.e. the “null” or intercept only model), 
the overall model overestimates the home victories, by 165 matches (i.e. 568 instead of 
correctly 403), it slightly overestimates the home defeats, (202 instead of correctly 192) and 
strongly underestimates the draws (36 instead of 211).  
 
Table 3: Classification of predicted results 
 Predicted Observed 
results 
Marginal 
% 
Observed 
SGDif 
Marginal 
% 
 Victory Draw Defeat Correct   
Victory 361 8 34 89,6% 403 50,0% 511 63,4% 
Draw 138 16 57 7,6% 211 26,2% 84 10,4% 
Defeat 69 12 111 57,8% 192 23,8% 211 26,2% 
Overall % 70,5% 4,5% 25,1% 60,5% 806  806 100,0% 
 
 
As expected, the SGDif alone is a strong categorical predictor for home victories and defeats. 
For instance, the positive SGDif predicts home victories in 511 matches, an error of +108 
matches, and the negative SGDif predicts home defeats in 211 matches, an error of +19 
matches. We can therefore conclude that SGDif is the most important variable to decide the 
outcome of a match in a tournament, such as the CL, and our model with all these variables 
seems to be rather good at explaining, at least, the home victories. 
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Finally, using the sorting function in SPSS, we tried to identify the 34 matches which were 
expected to be home victories but finished with home defeats9. Based on the significant 
estimates of Table 2, the first filter we used was “at least +2 SoG difference”. That filter 
eliminated 147 home defeats and 45 home defeats remained. The next filter was “at least +1 
SW difference10”. Eight more matches were eliminated and 37 matches were left. The final 
filter is “at least -1 RC difference”. Three more matches, Barcelona-Juventus, Lyon-Ajax and 
Sporting-Bayern were eliminated and we are finally left with the 34 “wrong” result matches, 
depicted in Table A3. Notice that ten of these matches were play-off games and consequently 
very important to the home teams. Apart from this year’s finalist Liverpool, who was defeated 
at home by Barcelona, all other nine home teams were eliminated, mainly due to their home 
defeat.  
 
The most unexpected result was Olympiacos-Rosenborg, in the 2005-06 CL tournament. 
Olympiacos had a difference of +10 in SoG against Rosenborg, and also a higher ranking. 
Based only on Rank and SGDif home victory estimates, from Table 2, the probability of home 
victory to Olympiacos was %95.99
e1
1
)10*673.1*976(.
cosOlympia
victory =+= +−π , which is 15 percentage 
units higher than the same probability of an “average” home team. Against all odds, 
Rosenborg, playing in Piraeus, in front of a huge and enthusiastic Greek public, won that 
match by 3-1, to prove once more that perfect predictions11 do not exist in football games.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Estimating sporting production functions using match-play statistics, involves a large number 
of specification problems and measurement errors in the variables. Keeping in mind that in 
football matches, the role of chance and luck, the referees’ decisions, or the managerial and 
coaching ability and tactical decisions are important parameters, it is very difficult to argue 
with certainty which variables explain victories or defeats in a tournament, like the UEFA CL. 
Our OLS estimates show though the following expected effects: 
 
                                                 
9 We paid no attention to whether the “wrong” result can be partially explained by the “unimportant match 
effect” mentioned earlier.  
10 In fact, since SW difference is negative, we tried first with “less than -1”. Since the intersection of filter 1 and 
2 excluded almost all matches, we changed the less significant SW difference to “at least higher than +1”. 
11 After that defeat, rumours were spread in Piraeus that even Olympiacos’ officials bet against their own team in 
many bookmakers, and won a huge amount of money!  
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Highly ranked teams, irrespectively if they play at home or away, who play offensively, 
measured by shots on goal and corners per ball possession, shots on targets per all shots, or 
simply shots on goals, are expected to win their matches. The low ranked teams, the teams 
who are punished by yellow and red cards for the fouls their commit, or simply when their 
players are expulsed by red cards, are shooting frequently wide, win more corners (!), have 
higher ball possession share (!), and do not succeed with their offside strategy, measured by 
the number of the opposite teams’ offside per own ball possession, are expected to be 
defeated. Obviously, keeping the ball per se, might entertain the public and decrease shooting 
opportunities to the opponent players, but does not lead to goals, unless the players are finally 
shooting on goal, preferably from a favourable position. Why corners are negative to 
victories, can be explained by the following argument. Perhaps, the tall defenders leave their 
defence and go to the opposite area expecting to head the ball in the goal, and if that risky 
strategy fails, the other team can score relatively easy, with a quick counter-attack. 
 
In the multinomial logistic regressions, it seems that teams will win two out of their three 
home matches, if the home players are shooting on goal approximately two more shots than 
the away teams’ players. The home defeat probability in that case is around 30.4%. Also, 
approximately one out of three home teams are defeated at home if they play against teams 
with lower ranking, while in ten matches, the strongest seven teams beat the weaker ones. 
Using differences in all published match-play statistics and the ranking of the teams, as 
explanatory variables, our model predicts home victories in 9 out of 10 matches, misses 8 
draws and 34 defeats. It also predicts 111 home defeats, misses 12 draws and 69 victories. As 
a whole, 488 out of 806 matches are predicted correctly, a rather satisfactory share for that 
“beautiful game”. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Selected descriptive statistics (N = 806) 
Variable Min match Max match Sum Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Home team goals scored 0 191 matches 8 Monaco-Deportivo 1235 1.53 .047 
Away team goals scored 0 78 matches 5 Deportivo-Monaco 802 1.00 .036 
Home team shots on goal 0 Lokomotiv-Milan 19 Valencia-Basel 5056 6.27 .107 
Away team shots on goal 0 17 matches 12 7 matches 3526 4.37 .083 
Home team corners 0 9 matches 20 Lyon-Barcelona 4638 5.75 .106 
Away team corners 0 33 matches 16 Dynamo Kyiv-Arsenal 3261 4.05 .087 
Home team offside 0 71 matches 16 Juventus-Bremen 2722 3.38 .092 
Away team offside 0 76 matches 14 Rapid Wien-Juventus 2624 3.26 .089 
Home team fouls 
committed 4 
PSV-Liverpool, 
Arsenal-Sparta 37 Juventus-Real 13305 16.51 .180 
Away team fouls committed 5 5 matches 37 Leverkusen-Olympiacos 14401 17.87 .194 
Home team shots wide 0 Panathinaikos-Schalke 20 
Milan-Celtic,  
Ajax-Inter 5369 6.66 .105 
Away team shots wide 0 14 matches 17 Sparta-Ajax 3979 4.94 .092 
Home team yellow cards 0 194 matches 8 Roma-Lyon 1159 1.44 .042 
Away team yellow cards 
0 105 matches 7 
Liverpool-Boavista, 
Leverkusen-
Fenerbahce 
1658 2.06 .049 
Home team red cards 0 758 matches 2 4 matches 52 .06 .009 
Away team red cards 0 726 matches 2 8 matches 88 .11 .012 
Home team ball possession 
(%) 32 Udinese-Barcelona 71 
Barcelona-Celtic,  
Valencia-Inter 41871 51.95 .213 
Away team ball possession 
(%) 29 
Barcelona-Celtic,  
Valencia-Inter 68 Udinese-Barcelona 38729 48.05 .213 
Home team ball possession 
(minutes) 18 Chelsea-Barcelona 46.1 PSV-Lyon
12 23383 29 .154 
Away team ball possession 
(minutes) 13 Bremen-Juventus 44 Udinese-Barcelona 21556 26.45 .148 
Note: In bald are the home (first) and away (second) teams who have the highest and lowest records in the 
respective top or bottom match. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 That match required extra time of 30´and was decided after penalty shoots-outs. Among the 90´ matches, the 
highest ball possession time is held again by PSV in its home match against Liverpool. Moreover, that is almost 
3 minutes lower compared to Barcelona’s top time of 44 minutes, in its away match (!) against Udinese at the 
group stage in 2005-06.  
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Table A2: Correlation Matrix of selected match variables (N = 806) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 .515 .013 -.011 -.027 -.03 -.105 -.008 -.039 -.007 .014 -.013 .023 -.054 -.015 .060 -.087 .075 
 1 .218 .274 -.118 -.108 -.087 .005 .194 .032 -.023 -.218 -.110 -.028 .036 .085 -.014 -.032 
  1 .297 -.211 -.052 -.074 -.035 .314 -.024 -.251 -1 -.310 .064 .051 .074 .049 -.252 
   1 -.131 -.064 -.007 -.056 .343 .103 -.057 -.297 -.208 .015 .044 .072 .035 -.123 
    1 .363 .113 .047 -.119 -.035 .025 .211 .045 .148 .100 .038 .027 .014 
     1 .217 .043 -.123 .107 .067 .052 .005 .129 .176 .026 .039 -.055 
      1 .060 -.040 .065 .061 .074 .030 .051 .067 .045 -.006 -.037 
       1 -.131 -.033 .001 .035 -.016 .073 .007 .035 -.030 -.030 
        1 .076 -.067 -.343 -.140 -.050 .028 .095 .035 -.156 
1 .505 .024 -.032 -.020 .007 -.055 .076 -.082 
 1 .251 .283 -.112 -.033 -.078 -.025 .188 
  1 .310 -.064 -.051 -.074 -.049 .252 
   1 -.097 -.088 -.031 -.069 .271 
    1 .346 .050 .028 -.077 
     1 .303 .031 -.074 
      1 -.006 -.082 
       1 -.120 
Note: (1) = Home Team Goals Scored (HGS) 
(2) =  “            Shots on Goal (HSoG) 
(3) =  “            Ball Possession (in %) (HBP) 
(4) =  “            Corners (HC) 
(5) =  “            Fouls Committed (HFC) 
(6) =  “            Yellow Cards (HYC) 
(7) =  “            Red Cards (HRC) 
(8) =  “            Offside (HO) 
(9) =                     “            Shots Wide (HSW) 
 
(10) =           Away Team Goals Scored (AGS) 
(11) =  “            Shots on Goal (ASoG)  
(12) =  “            Ball possession (in %) (ABP)  
(13) =  “            Corners (AC)  
(14) =  “            Fouls Committed (AFC)         1 
(15) =  “            Yellow Cards (AYC) 
(16) =  “            Red Cards (ARC) 
(17) =  “            Offside (AO) 
(18) =                   “            Shots Wide (ASW) 
 
Bald values are significant at 0.01level (2-tailed); bald italic values are significant at 0.05level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Table A3: The 34 unpredicted home teams’ defeats 
Match 
Year Match 
type HG AG SGD BPD CD SWD YD RD FD OD 
Home 
rank 
Olympiacos-Rosenborg 2005-06 group 1 3 10 22 10 4 -1 0 -14 -3 1 
Lyon-Barcelona 2001-02 group 2 3 9 8 20 8 -1 0 -14 -3 0 
Porto-Artmedia 2005-06 group 2 3 9 30 12 13 -3 0 -4 -1 1 
Dynamo Kyiv-Juventus 2001-02 group 1 2 7 -10 -1 4 -1 0 -5 3 0 
Panathinaikos-Udinese 2005-06 group 1 2 7 12 1 1 -3 0 -15 -2 1 
Porto-Real 2001-02 group 1 2 6 14 7 8 1 0 9 5 0 
Porto-Sparta 2001-02 group 0 1 6 8 10 5 -2 0 1 -2 1 
Rosenborg-Real 2005-06 group 0 2 6 -4 13 2 -4 0 -5 -1 0 
Stuttgart-Chelsea 2003-04 play-off 0 1 6 6 2 6 -3 0 -2 0 0 
Deportivo-Man. United 2001-02 play-off 0 2 5 10 1 6 -1 0 -3 -4 0 
Barcelona-Real 2001-02 play-off 0 2 5 12 0 6 0 0 1 -1 0 
Bayern-Milan 2002-03 play-off 1 2 5 14 4 5 1 0 4 -3 1 
Real-Roma 2002-03 group 0 1 5 20 14 1 -1 0 -9 3 1 
Bayern-Juventus 2004-05 group 0 1 5 12 0 5 -2 0 0 -3 1 
Marseille-Porto 2003-04 group 2 3 4 6 0 1 -4 0 -4 -4 0 
Liverpool-Barcelona 2006-07 play-off 0 1 4 -14 -4 4 3 0 -1 -1 0 
Dynamo Kyiv-Steaua 2006-07 group 1 4 4 14 12 6 -3 0 -13 -1 0 
Galatasaray-Sociedad 2003-04 group 1 2 4 20 4 4 2 1 3 -7 1 
Leverkusen-Man. United 2002-03 group 1 2 4 28 7 6 -1 0 -10 1 0 
Lazio-Nantes 2001-02 group 1 3 3 6 7 1 -1 0 2 1 1 
Newcastle-Feyenoord 2002-03 group 0 1 3 4 4 4 -3 0 -5 5 0 
Arsenal-Inter 2003-04 group 0 3 3 8 4 4 0 0 -3 1 1 
Bayern-Milan 2006-07 play-off 0 2 3 14 6 6 2 0 2 -3 0 
Liverpool-Benfica 2005-06 play-off 0 2 3 20 12 5 0 0 -3 -2 1 
Benfica-Villarreal 2005-06 group 0 1 3 14 2 5 -2 0 -8 0 0 
Betis-Liverpool 2005-06 group 1 2 3 20 7 5 -2 0 -11 1 0 
Marseille-Real 2003-04 group 1 2 3 -16 2 4 -1 0 15 -2 0 
Ajax-Arsenal 2005-06 group 1 2 3 20 -2 7 2 0 6 0 0 
Juventus-Deportivo 2003-04 play-off 0 1 3 20 6 3 1 0 -2 7 1 
Lyon-Roma 2006-07 play-off 0 2 3 20 5 4 2 0 11 -8 1 
Milan-Brugge 2003-04 group 0 1 3 24 10 14 -1 0 -12 0 1 
Basel-Man. United 2002-03 group 1 3 2 -8 4 2 -1 0 -4 2 0 
Rangers-Man. United 2003-04 group 0 1 2 4 -1 5 -2 0 -5 -2 0 
Bremen-Lyon 2004-05 play-off 0 3 2 14 10 13 -1 0 -8 -3 0 
Note: Teams in bald from the play-off matches were qualified.
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